Tightly Coupled Secret Sharing and Its Application to Group
  Authentication by Miao, Fuyou et al.
Tightly Coupled Secret Sharing and Its Application to
Group Authentication
Fuyou Miao, Keju Meng, Yue Yu, Wenchao Huang, Yan Xiong, Xingfu
Wang
University of Science and Technology of China, No.96, JinZhai Road Baohe
District,Hefei,Anhui, 230026,P.R.China
Abstract
Group oriented applications are getting more and more popular in today’s
mobile Internet and call for secure and efficient (t,n) threshold secret sharing
scheme (or (t,n)-SS) to meet their requirements. A (t,n)-SS divides a secret
into n shares such that any t or more than t shares can recover the secret
while less than t shares cannot. However, an adversary, even without a valid
share, may obtain the secret by mounting Illegal Participant (IP) attack or
Half Threshold Channel Cracking (HTCC) attack. Therefore, 1) the paper
presents the notion and generic framework of (t,m,n)-Tightly Coupled Se-
cret Sharing ((t,m,n)-TCSS). Prior to recovering the secret, it requires m
(m ≥ t) participants to form a tightly coupled group by each independently
constructing a component with the share. All m components have to be used
to recover the secret and thus both attacks can be thwarted more directly
and simply. Furthermore, following the framework, threshold changeable se-
cret sharing can also be easily constructed. 2) As an implementation of the
framework, a linear code based (t,m,n)-TCSS scheme is proposed. Analyses
show that the scheme can prevent IP, HTCC and (t − 1)-Insider conspiring
attacks with asymptotically perfect security. Moreover, it doesn’t depend on
any computational assumption and is more secure and efficient in storage,
communication and computation when compared with related schemes. 3)
Based on (t,m,n)-TCSS, a group authentication scheme is constructed, which
allows a group user to authenticate whether all users are legal group mem-
bers at once and thus provides efficient and flexible m-to-m authentication
for group oriented applications.
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1. Introduction
1.1. Traditional (t,n)-threshold secret sharing and its applications
With the development of mobile Internet, network applications don’t limit
to 1-to-1 or 1-to-m (i.e., client/server) interaction pattern any more. Group
oriented applications with m-to-m interaction pattern are getting more and
more popular especially in mobile social apps. Group chat is one of group
oriented applications provided by most social apps, and it is actually an
online meeting system and allows a user to invite his/her friends to have
a meeting anytime and anywhere. For example, WeChat, the most popular
mobile social app with over 600 million users in Asia, enables a user to initiate
a group for an ad hoc session on demand. In the group, any user is allowed
to send/receive messages, start an audio/video chat or invite his/her friends
into the group. Consequently, a user may not be familiar with some other
users. However, a main concern about the online meeting is authentication.
That is, each user needs to make sure that any other user in the group has the
right identity, especially when the meeting is confidential. That is because
any user at a confidential meeting is responsible for the information he/she
releases, and never wants any wrong person to have access to it. In this case,
each user needs to authenticate all the others successfully, or else the meeting
must be aborted.
Traditionally, one user employs a 1-to-1 authentication scheme to verify
another user’s identity. In such a scheme, one user (verifier) gets convinced
that the other user (prover) is the right one it claims to be. If the 1-to-1
scheme is trivially applied to mutual authentication within a group of m
users, there are totally m(m− 1) rounds of authentication. Nevertheless, m
rounds are sufficient for the same case if m-to-m authentication scheme is
employed, because the new authentication allows each user to verify whether
all users are legal group members at once. Therefore, it is of great importance
to find a proper cryptographic tool in designing secure and efficient m-to-m
authentication schemes for group oriented applications.
As a group oriented cryptographic primitive, (t,n)-threshold secret shar-
ing scheme (or (t,n)-SS) divides a secret into n shares and allocates each
share to a shareholder, such that at least t shareholders (i.e., participants)
are qualified to recover the secret but less than t are not. In a group of
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exact t shareholders, each shareholder can verify whether all t shareholders
are legal at once if they mutually exchange shares, independently reconstruct
the secret and check the correctness. Therefore, (t,n)-SSs have potential in
building m-to-m authentication schemes.
Since (t,n)-SS was first introduced separately by Shamir [1] and Blakley
[22] in 1979, it has been studied extensively in the literature [23] [21] [24]
[26] [25] and widely used in many applications, such as secure multiparty
computation [27], threshold signature [28], group key agreement [29], group
authentication [20] etc. al. As the most popular (t,n)-SS, Shamir’s scheme [1]
is constructed based on a polynomial of degree at most (t−1) in a finite field.
Blakley’s scheme [22] is based on hyperplane while Asmuth-Bloom’s scheme
[23] and Mignotte’s scheme [21] are both based on Chinese Remainder The-
orem. Linear code is another tool to construct (t,n)-SSs. In 1981, McEliece
and Sarwate [24] proposed a formulation of (t,n) threshold secret sharing
scheme based on maximum-distance-separable (MDS) codes, and pointed
out that Shamir’s (t,n) threshold scheme can be constructed equivalently by
using Reed-Solomon code. Subsequently, many secret sharing schemes based
on linear codes were proposed [26] [19] [18]. In [26] [19], Massey utilized the
linear code to construct a secret sharing scheme, meanwhile he also presented
the relationship between the access structure of secret sharing and the min-
imal code word of the dual code in linear code. All the above (t,n)-SSs do
not depend on any computational assumption of hard problem or one way
function.
In general, a (t,n)-SS scheme consists of share generation and secret
reconstruction. In share generation, the dealer generates n shares from
the secret to be shared and allocates each shareholder a share securely. In
secret reconstruction, t or more than t shareholders (also called partic-
ipants or players) exchange shares privately and thus each participant can
recover the secret from collected shares.
1.2. Two attacks against traditional (t,n)-SSs during secret reconstruction
Actually, these above traditional (t,n)-SSs are not secure in practice. In
the following, we consider 2 attacks against secret reconstruction with
more than t participants, 1) Illegal Participant (or IP) attack and 2) Half
Threshold private Channel Cracking (or HTCC) attack.
Both IP and HTCC attacks enable an adversary to obtain the secret
without having any valid share.
1) IP attack
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Suppose there are m, (m ≥ t + 1), participants in secret reconstruction,
and one of them is an adversary without any valid share. If participants
are not required to release their shares simultaneously and the adversary,
in the name of some legal shareholder, (e.g. Shareholder2 in Fig.1) may
communicate with the others, it could wait to collect enough (i.e.,m− 1 ≥ t)
valid shares from the other participants and thus recover the secret. With
these shares, the adversary can also forge a valid share and then act as a
legal participant without being detected. We call it Illegal Participant (IP)
Attack.
Shareholder1:s1
Shareholder4:s4
Shareholder3:s3
Illegal Participant 
impersonating Shareholder2
s1,s3,s4s
:Private channel
Figure 1: Example of IP attack with threshold 3
One countermeasure against the IP attack is user authentication [17] [16].
It guarantees that only right shareholders are allowed to participate in secret
reconstruction, but user authentication makes (t,n)-SS more complicated be-
cause each participant needs to be authenticated by the others. Moreover,
whether a secret can be recovered should depend on the share a participant
holds rather than his/her identity.
2) HTCC attack
In traditional (t,n)-SSs, there usually exists a private channel between
each pair of participants, by which 2 participants exchange shares privately.
Once an adversary cracks a private channel, it can intercept any information
through the channel, including 2 shares of the involved participants. Con-
sequently, an adversary may recover the secret if it manages to crack dt/2e
distinct private channels, even though the number of participant m may be
much larger than the threshold t. We called it Half Threshold private Chan-
nel Cracking (or HTCC) attack.
Similarly, if each participant, say A, sends its share to participant B via
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a private channel while receives share from B via another private channel,
an adversary may recover the secret if it manages to crack t distinct private
channels.
That is, the robustness of (t, n)-SS against private channel cracking attack
depends on t rather than m. Obviously, it is more desirable if the robustness
depends on the number of participant m instead of t due to m ≥ t.
Note that, for the convenience of discussion, the paper just takes the
former case (i.e., HTCC attack) as example since the latter case is highly
similar to the former.
Remark 1.1. Although adversaries in IP and HTCC attacks both have
no valid share and need to collect enough shares by mounting attack before
obtaining the secret, they are different in substance. An IP adversary may
actively participate in secret reconstruction while a HTCC adversary merely
eavesdrops cracked private channels passively and stays out of secret recon-
struction. In other words, the information (i.e.,fake share) of the adverary in
IP attack is used by all the other participants in secret reconstruction and
thus leads to error, while all information used by participants is correct in
HTCC attack. This results in the fact that a countmeasure valid for one
attack is not always valid for the other. For example, user authentication
[17] [16] can prevent IP attack but cannot thwart HTCC attack; In contrast,
Harn’s secure secret reconstruction [13] is resistant to HTCC attack but fails
to prevent IP attack in most cases.
Shareholder1:s1
Shareholder4:s4
Shareholder3:s3
Shareholder2:s2
Adversary
s4
s2
s3
s2
s2,s3,s4s
:Private channel :Eaveasdropping
Figure 2: Example of HTCC attack with threshold 3
1.3. Related Work
As far as we know, there are the following 3 related countermeasures
against IP or HTCC attack in secret sharing.
5
1) Shuffling Schemes
Currently, complete shuffling [15] and partial shuffling [14] schemes are
available to cope with HTCC as well as IP attack in (t,n)-SS.
Incomplete shuffling [15] with m participants, every pair of participants
exchange a shuffling factor (i.e. random integer), and thus each finally gets
(m− 1) shuffling factors in total. A participant constructs a shuffled partial
share with the (m − 1) shuffling factors. All m shuffled partial shares are
required to recover the secret; and thus a complete shuffling based (t,n)-SS
forces an adversary to crack at least dm/2e distinct private channels before
figuring out the secret. There are totally m(m − 1)/2 shuffling factors ex-
changed in the scheme, which is obviously inefficient in communication for
large m. Subsequently, Zhang proposed the partial shuffling scheme [14], m
participants form a loop in some order and communicate along the loop, each
of them just picks one random number as the shuffling factor such that the
sum of all shuffling factors is zero. Consequently, m participants need to
exchange m shuffling factors in total, and an adversary has to crack at least
t private channel before obtaining the secret. However, both schemes require
extra communication to exchange shuffling factor before secret reconstruc-
tion.
2) Threshold Changeable Secret Sharing
(t, n)−threshold changeable secret sharing scheme (threshold changeable
SS) allows shareholders to change threshold from t to t′> t. In this case, t′
or more than t′ shareholders can recover the secret while less than t′ cannot.
Therefore, some (t, n)−threshold changeable SSs can prevent IP and HTCC
attacks if there are exact t′ participants with t ≤ t′ ≤ n and the threshold
is also raised to t′. For example,the dealer in schemes [12][11], generate
multiple shares for every shareholder, each share with a distinct threshold
t′ > t. Therefore, if shares with t′ threshold are used to reconstruct the secret,
exact t′ participants can prevent IP and HTCC attacks. However, every
shareholder in such schemes has to hold multiple shares and thus requires
more storage, moreover, these schemes only raise threshold to predefined
values.
As an improvement, Ron Steinfeld et al presented a lattice-based thresh-
old changeable SS [10], shareholders add some noise to their shares or delete
some bits of their share to compute subshares, which contain partial infor-
mation about the original shares. As a result, a larger number t′ > t of
subshares are required to recover the secret by using a ”error-correction”
combiner algorithm. The scheme does not require communication either be-
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tween the dealer and shareholders or among shareholders. However, 1) the
share combiner needs to communicate with all participants and instruct them
to change threshold; 2) the scheme is lattice-based and thus is complicated in
computation; 3) it is far from a perfect scheme. In 2017, H. Pilaram and T.
Eghlidos proposed a lattice based threshold changeable multi-secret sharing
scheme [9].
Nojoumian et al [8] presented a Shamir’s (t,n)-SS based dealer-free thresh-
old changeable scheme using secure multiparty computation. The scheme
remains some properties of Shamir’s (t,n)-SS, such as being unconditionally
secure and ideal, moreover, it can change the threshold to any value. Later
on, they also proposed a method of increasing threshold by zero addition [7],
it increases the threshold by generating shares of a polynomial that corre-
sponds to a secret with value zero and threshold t′ > t, and adding these new
shares to player’s current shares. However, due to resharing operation, both
schemes require too much computation in participants and communication
among participants. In 2016, Yuan et al [6] came up with 2 threshold change-
able schemes based on Lagrange interpolation polynomial and 2-variable one-
way function. Both schemes require the dealer to evaluate and store a lot of
values before increasing the threshold. Moreover, it needs the combiner (i.e.,
the proxy of the dealer) to send each participant a distinct key to active the
share additionally.
In conclusion, current threshold changeable SSs suffer from either large
storage or heavy computation/communication. In section 4, we will propose
a special SS scheme which is capable of thwarting IP and HTCC attacks and
efficient in storage, computation and communication.
3) Secure Secret Reconstruction
Recently, Harn [13] introduced a notion of secure secret reconstruction
and proposed the (t,n)-secure secret reconstruction (or SSR) scheme. The
scheme takes advantage of the homomorphism of polynomials [3] and does
not call for extra communication before recovering the secret. It claims that
the secret can only be reconstructed if each participant has valid shares, and
thus can defeat IP and HTCC attacks without using user authentication.
Actually it is not true. Based on similar idea, Harn et al [5] also proposed
a bivariate SS scheme, which has the similar problem. We will discuss it in
section 3.
Therefore, it is necessary to construct an efficient secret sharing scheme
against both IP and HTCC attacks simultaneously to meet the security re-
quirement of aforementioned group oriented applications.
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1.4. Contributions
We summarize the contributions in 3 aspects.
1) In order to cope with IP and HTCC attacks against (t,n)-SS, the
paper presents the notion and generic framework of (t,m,n)-Tightly Cou-
pled Secret Sharing (or (t,m,n)-TCSS). By following the framework, most
traditional (t,n)-SSs can be simply converted into (t,m,n)-TCSSs and thus
endowed with the capability to frustrate both attacks. It should be noted
that (t,m,n)-TCSS under the framework can be applied to any scenario of
(t,n)-SS. Moreover, threshold changeable secret sharing schemes can also be
easily constructed according to the framework.
2) As an implementation of the framework, a concrete (t,m,n)-TCSS
scheme is proposed from the traditional linear code based (t,n)-SS. The
(t,m,n)-TCSS does not depend on any hard problem or one-way function.
In contrast with related schemes, the (t,m,n)-TCSS is resistant to the above
2 attacks without special limitations and more efficient in storage, computa-
tion and communication.
3) As an application of the (t,m,n)-TCSS scheme, a group authentication
protocol is constructed to enable the rapid m-to-m authentication in group
oriented applications.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In next section, we briefly
review the linear code based (t,n)-SS and Harn’s Secure Secret Reconstruc-
tion; section 3 gives the definition of Tightly Coupled Secret Sharing. We
describe our proposed (t,m,n)-TCSS and analyze the security in section 4
and section 5 respectively, section 6 summarizes the properties of (t,m,n)-
TCSS. As an application, the group authentication protocol is constructed
in section 7. Finally, we present some discussions and conclude the paper in
section 8 and section 9 respectively.
2. Preliminaries
2.1. Notations and terms
1) Notations
Here are some notations used throughout the paper, In denotes the integer
set {1, 2, ..., n} and is used to lable all n shareholders; Im, with the cardinality
|Im| = m, (t ≤m≤ n) is a subset of In, Im is used to lable any m out of
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n shareholders; Fp = {0, 1, 2, ..., p − 1} is a finite field for large prime p,
F ∗p = {1, 2, ..., p− 1} is the multiplicative group of Fp; r∈UFp denotes that r
is a random number uniformly distributed in Fp. |S| is the cardinality of set
S.
In (t,n)-SS, a shareholder is also called participant when it is participating
in secret recovering. So shareholder and participant will be used alternately
during secret reconstruction.
2) Information theoretical terms
Now we introduce some basic terms in information theory, suppose X, Y
are discrete-time discrete-valued random variables with sample space SP1, SP2.
The entropy of X is denoted as
H(X) = E(−log2P (X)) =
∑
x∈SP1
−P (x)log2P (x)
where E is the expectation operator and P (X) is the probability distribu-
tion function of X. From the view of an adversary, the secret s in (t,n)-SS
is indistinguishable from a random variable uniformly distributed in secret
space. Therefore, we use H(s) to denote uncertainty of the secret.
The mutual information of X with Y is written as
I(X;Y ) = H(X)−H(X/Y ) =
∑
x∈SP1,y∈SP2
P (xy)log2P (x/y)/P (x).
I(X;Y ) means the amount of information about X obtained due to the
knowledge Y . In the following sections, we will write log2P (x) as logP (x)
for simplicity.
3) Some Definitions
Definition 2.1. (Perfect (t,n)-SS) Let s, S and Ω be the secret, secret
space and the share set of a (t,n)-SS respectively with |Ω| = n. The (t,n)-SS
is perfect with respect to probability distribution of s on the secret space S
if
1) H(s) ≥ 0
2) I(s; ΩJ) = H(s)−H(s|ΩJ) = 0,
where ΩJ denotes any subset of Ω with less than t shares, i.e. ΩJ ⊆ Ω and
|ΩJ | < t.
As a secret value, the secret s actually appears as a random variable
uniformly distributed in secret space S. In a perfect (t,n)-SS, less than t
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shareholders get no information about the secret even if they have up to
t− 1 shares. Loosening the perfect (t,n)-SS a little bit, we get the definition
of asymptotically perfect (t,n)-SS as follows.
Definition 2.2. (Asymptotically Perfect (t,n)-SS) A (t,n)-SS is asymp-
totically perfect with respect to probability distribution of s on secret space
S if, for all ΩJ with |ΩJ | < t, we have
1) H(s) ≥ 0
2) lim|S|→∞ I(s; ΩJ) = 0
where |S| is the cardinality of S.
Asymptotically perfect (t, n)-SS implies that less than t shareholders get
nearly no information about the secret when the secret space converges to
infinity.
2.2. Traditional (t,n)-SS based on Linear Code
There are several ways to construct a (t,n)-SS scheme based on linear
code [26], one of them comes as follows:
Assume that a [n+ 1, t] linear code LC is a subspace of F n+1p with length
n + 1 and dimension t, and G = (~g0, ~g1, ...~gn) is the public generator matrix
of linear code LC, where ~gi ∈ F tp, (0 ≤ i ≤ n) is a nonzero column vector, G
has the rank t.
In the traditional (t,n)-SS scheme based on LC, there is a dealer and n
shareholders U1, U2, ..., Un, the secret s is a value in Fp. The scheme consists
of the following two steps:
Share Generation: The dealer privately chooses a row vector ~v = (v0, v1, ..., vt−1) ∈
F tp, such that the secret is s = ~v~g0 mod p, it is obvious that there are totally
pt−1 such ~v for a given pair (s,~g0). The dealer generates the code word
~w = (s0, s1, ..., sn) = ~vG mod p and allocates si = ~v~gi mod p to Ui as the
share securely, i = 1, 2, ..., n.
Secret Reconstruction: If m, (m ≥ t) out of n shareholders, UIm =
{Ui1 , Ui2 , ..., Uim} need to recover the secret s, they first find a group of param-
eters {bi1 , bi2 , ..., bim} over Fp such that ~g0 = bi1~gi1 +bi2~gi2 + ...+bim~gim mod p
holds, and then pool their shares {si1 , si2 , ..., sim} in private to compute the
secret as
s = ~v~g0 =
m∑
j=1
bij~v~gij =
m∑
j=1
bijsij mod p.
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2.3. Harn’s Secure Secret Reconstruction
In 2014, Harn [13] proposed a (t,n) secure secret reconstruction (or SSR)
scheme. The scheme claims to be resistant to IP attack without VSS or user
authentication. Our work is partly inspired by the notion of this scheme. It
works as follows.
1) Share generation
Suppose there are n shareholders, U = {U1, U2, ..., Un}, the dealer D
selects k random polynomials fl(x), l = 1, 2, .., k, over Fp with degree no
more than t − 1 each and generates k shares fl(x), l = 1, 2, .., k, for each
shareholder Ur, (Ur ∈ U). For any secret s, the dealer can always find
integers, wl, dl, (l = 1, 2, .., k) in Fp, such that s =
∑k
l=1 dlfl(wl), where
wi 6= wj and wi, wj /∈ {x1, x2, ..., xn} for every pair of i and j, xi is the
public information of Ui(Ui ∈ U). The dealer makes these integers wl, dl,
l = 1, 2, .., k, publicly known.
2) Secret reconstruction
Assume m, (t ≤m≤ n) out of n shareholders want to recover the secret,
each participant Uri , i = 1, 2, ...,m, Uri ∈ U uses shares fl(xri), l = 1, 2, .., k to
compute a Lagrange component, cri =
∑m
l=1 dlfl(xri)
∏m
v=1,v 6=i
wl−xrv
xri−xrv
mod p,
and releases cri to all the other participants secretly.
After knowing cri , (i = 1, 2, ..,m), each participant computes the secret
as s =
∑m
i=1 cri mod p.
Remark 2.1. The scheme claims to require kt > n − 1 to guarantee the
security, otherwise, an adversary may collect kt Lagrange components, con-
struct the k polynomials and finally recover the secret. As a matter of fact, m
Lagrange components is linearly dependent in the case of k+ t−1 < m < kt.
Interested readers can refer to [4] for more detail. Therefore, it is possible for
an adversary to forge a valid Lagrange component from the other m−1 ones
and finally obtain the secret without being detected. That is, the scheme is
vulnerable to IP attack.
3. Definition of (t,m,n)-Tightly Coupled Secret Sharing
This section first presents the basic idea and overview of (t,m,n)-Tightly
Coupled Secret Sharing (or (t,m,n)-TCSS), then puts forward the notion of
(t,m,n)-TCSS, defines the framework and finally presents the property of the
new type of SS.
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3.1. Basic Idea and Overview of (t,m,n)-TCSS
Currently, most related work cannot effectively and efficiently deal with
IP and HTCC attacks. In order to simultaneously defeat both attacks during
secret reconstruction in traditional (t, n)-SS, we define a new type of SS,
(t,m, n)-Tightly Coupled Secret Sharing. On one hand, it is more secure
(t, n)-SS and can be applied to any scenario of (t, n)-SS; On the other hand,
it provides a suitable cryptographic primitive for group oriented applications.
As we know, for traditional (t, n)-SSs, the reason why IP and HTCC
attacks work lies in the direct exchange of bare shares among participants
(i.e.,shareholders) during secret reconstruction. In other words, since shares
are sent from one participant to another through private channel, an illegal
participant are able to directly collect shares from the others, or an adversary
can directly intercept shares as long as it cracks the private channel. Con-
sequently, the secret may be obtained illegally if enough shares are collected
in the above 2 ways.
After learning the aforementioned reason, we need to present a new type
of secret sharing which does not requires bare shares to be transmitted among
participants during secret reconstruction. That is, to secure secret recon-
struction, the following 2 requirements need to be satisfied at the same time.
1) Shares need to be protected before transmission through private channels,
such that an illegal participant cannot figure out the share itself even if it
obtains the protected share. By this property, IP attack can be prevented.
2) All participants’ protected shares need to be directly used to recover the
secret (i.e., need not to uncover any share from the protected one), such that
an adversary has to intercept all protected shares before obtaining the secret.
By this property, HTCC attack can be thwarted accordingly.
In summary, we need to find a solution based on traditional (t, n)-SSs to
protect share during share exchange among participants and guarantee that
each protected share has to be directly used to recover the secret.
From the 2 requirements, we can determine the 3 steps of (t,m, n)-TCSS,
1) share generation, which is basically the same as traditional (t,n)-SS and
responsible for generating and distributing a share to each shareholder se-
curely. 2) component construction, in which each participant constructs
a protected share, called Component, from its own share and all partici-
pants’ public information non-interactively. 3) secret reconstruction, in
which all participants exchange their components, each participant recovers
the secret independently from all components.
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Following the basic idea, we can easily formulate the definition and frame-
work of (t,m,n)-TCSS, which is capable of thwarting both IP and HTCC
attacks and thus enables group oriented application.
3.2. Definition and Framework
Definition 3.1. (t,m,n)-Tightly coupled secret sharing
Informally, let t,m, n be positive integers with t ≤m≤ n. (t,m,n)-Tightly
coupled secret sharing (or (t,m,n)-TCSS ) is a special type of (t,n)-SS and
satisfies 1) any t or more than t shareholders are able to recover the secret;
2) less than t shareholders cannot reconstruct the secret and 3) when m
shareholders recover the secret, they form a tightly coupled group such that
the secret can be recovered only if each participant in the group has a valid
share.
A (t,m,n)-TCSS consists of 3 algorithms, Share Generation SG(s,U),
Component Construction CC(Um,Ωm, Rm), and Secret Reconstruction SR(Cm).
SG(s,U)-it takes the secret s and the set of n shareholders, U , as in-
put and generates Ω, the set of n shares as output. In this algorithm, the
dealer generates n shares from the secret s and allocates each share to the
corresponding shareholder in U securely.
CC(Um,Ωm, Rm)-it takes Um, Ωm as well as Rm as input and outputs
Cm, where Um is the set of participants, denoting a subset of U with m
shareholders, Ωm is the share set of Um, Rm is a set of m random numbers
and Cm is the set of m components. In this algorithm, each participant in
Um generates a component with its share in Ωm and a random number in Rm
non-interactively.
SR(Cm)-it takes Cm as input and recovers the secret s as output. In this
algorithm, each participant uses all m components of Um (i.e., Cm) to recover
the secret independently.
3.3. Formal Description and Property
Formally, let S be the secret space, SH share space and ID identity space
respectively in (t,n)-SS, s ∈ S is the secret. Assume U = {Ui|Ui ∈ ID, i =
1, 2, ..., n} are n shareholders, each shareholder Ui has the private share si ∈
SH and public identity Ui.
Before any m shareholders, Um, (i.e., Um ⊆ U and |Um| = m), want to
recover the secret, they need to form a tightly coupled group by constructing a
component each. That is, each shareholder Uj ∈ Um constructs a component
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cj = f(sj, rj,Um), where f : SH × S × SUB(ID) → SH is a component
construction function; sj is the share of Uj; rj is random number uniformly
selected from S, i.e., rj∈US, and SUB(ID) denotes the power set of ID.
Therefore, Cm = {cj = f(sj , rj,Um)|Uj ∈ Um} is a valid component set of
Um. The (t,n)-SS is a (t,m,n)-TCSS if
I(s; C′) =
{
H(s) ifC′ = Cm, t ≤ |Cm| = m ≤ n;
0 or ⇒ 0 if |C′ ∩ Cm| < m. (3− 1)
where the secret s is viewed as a random variable in S. C′ is a component set
actually used in recovering s, ⇒ 0 denotes converging to 0 if |S| approaches
to infinity.
Remark 3.1. The expression (3-1) implies the 2 facts, (1) If C′, the com-
ponent set actually used in secret reconstruction, is identical with Cm, the
right one generated by Um, and the number of participants is no less than t,
the secret is bound to be recovered; (2) If C′ does not contain all components
in Cm, almost no information about the secret can be obtained.
Remark 3.2. In fact, Uj’s component cj = f(sj , rj,Um) serves as 2 func-
tions, one is to hide the share sj from eavesdroppers (i.e., Outsiders in section
4.1) by using rj as perturbation; the other is to bind Uj (i.e. the share sj
) with all participant Um and thus make Uj inseparable from the others. In
this sense, we say that all participants in Um form a tightly coupled group,
the secret can be recovered only if all participants collaborate. That is why
we name our scheme Tightly Coupled Secret Sharing.
Remark 3.3. A (t,m,n)-TCSS is an improved (t,n)-SS, it directly uses com-
ponents, instead of shares, to recover the secret. On one hand, as a (t,n)-SS
, it requires at least t shareholders to reconstruct the secret. On the other
hand, once m (n ≥m≥ t) shareholders decide to recover the secret, they com-
pose a tightly coupled group by each generating a component independently.
In this case, the secret can be recovered only if all m participants have valid
components, which in turn means each participant has the right share.
4. Proposed (t,m,n)-TCSS based on Linear Code
This section proposes a concrete linear code based (t,m,n)-TCSS scheme
by following the above definition and framework.
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4.1. Entities and Model
There are 3 types of entity in our proposed (t,m,n)-TCSS scheme, the
Dealer, n shareholders and some adversaries. In order to facilitate group ori-
ented applications or some other distributed applications, we use the same
communication model as Harn’s scheme [13]. That is, during secret recon-
struction, each pair of participants share a private channel to exchange pri-
vate information (i.e., components in our scheme) and thus recover the secret
independently.
1) Dealer
The dealer is the honest coordinator trusted by all shareholders, and re-
sponsible for scheme setup such as determining system parameters, choosing
the secret, generating and distributing shares and so on. We simply assume
that the dealer allocates each share to the corresponding shareholder securely
since our work merely focuses on security during secret reconstruction.
2) Shareholders
There are totally n shareholders, each with a share generated by the
dealer. Every pair of them share a private channel to exchange informa-
tion. Different from most security model, we assume that the channel may
be cracked in extreme cases. Consequently, information through the channel
may be intercepted by adversaries. When m, (m ≥ t) shareholders (i.e. par-
ticipants) recover the secret, each of them first exchanges components with
the others through corresponding private channels. Then, every participant
independently recovers the secret from all components.
Note that once the secret is recovered, every participant has the secret.
Therefore, we assume that a shareholder only constructs a single component
in its lifetime and never generates more than one component with its share.
3) Adversaries
Our goal is to prevent an adversary, without any valid share, from access
to the secret illegally.
In most cases, legal shareholders care more about secret disclosure than
recovering the secret correctly, i.e. they would rather give up recovering
the secret than leak it to adversaries. Therefore, in order to prevent secret
disclosure, (t,m,n)-TCSS considers the following adversaries.
(1) Outsider: It is an adversary without any valid share. An Outsider
appears in 2 forms during secret reconstruction.
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a) Outsider-1: It impersonates a legal shareholder but without the
right share. That is, in the name of some legal shareholder, it is allowed to
receive private information (i.e., components in our scheme) from the other
participants and send a forged component to the others. An Outsider-1 aims
to forge a valid component from received ones or obtain the secret.
b) Outsider-2: It somehow cracks private channels between some par-
ticipants and thus can intercept any information ( i.e., components in our
scheme) through these cracked channels by eavesdropping. It aims to figure
out shares or even the secret from components available.
Note that, since a participant never generates more than one component
with its share, an Outsider can only obtain a single component from one
participant at most.
(2) Insider: It is actually a legal shareholder. When less than t share-
holders conspire to recover the secret, these misbehaving shareholders are
called Insiders. They aim to recover the secret with less than t shareholders
participating.
Remark 4.1. In secret reconstruction of traditional (t, n)-SS, shares
are exchanged privately among shareholders. In contrast, (t,m, n)-TCSS re-
quires components, instead of shares, to be exchanged among shareholders
during secret reconstruction. In (t, n)-SS, if an Outsider-2 cracks a private
channel between 2 participants, it can easily obtain the shares through the
cracked channel. Consequently, the Outsider-2 can take advantage of the in-
tercepted share and act as an Insider in the future. Therefore, Outsider-2 and
Insider are closely connected with each other in (t, n)-SS . However, the case
is quite different in (t,m, n)-TCSS. We know from section 3 that a component
has different properties from a share and a share cannot be obtained from
a given component. Moreover, an component binds a shareholder with the
other participants and make them inseparable. As a result, 1) an Outsider-
2 is distinct from an Insider in (t,m, n)-TCSS, since the Outsider-2 cannot
figure out any share even if it intercepts some components by eavesdrop-
ping. Therefore, if the Outsider-2 intercepts some components generated by
a tightly coupled group of m, (m > t) shareholders, it has to further collect
all the m components before obtaining the secret. In contrast, an Insider
is allowed to flexibly choose any number of shareholders to form a tightly
coupled group before secret reconstruction. Of course, as long as t insiders
are available, the secret can be recovered. 2) An Outsider-1 is also different
from Outsider-2 since Outsider-1 actively participates in secret reconstruc-
tion while Outsider-2 just passively eavesdrops components. The components
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collected by Outsider-1 contain information of its own while the components
intercepted by Outsider-2 do not have any information of itself.
4.2. Our Scheme
The proposed (t,m,n)-TCSS consists of 1)Share Generation, 2) Compo-
nent Construction and 3) Secret Reconstruction (see Figure 3).
In Share Generation, the dealer picks parameters to initialize the scheme,
generates n shares and allocates each one to a shareholder securely. If m,
(m ≥ t) shareholders need to recover the secret, they form a tightly cou-
pled group by each constructing a component with the share, a random
number and all participants’ identities (i.e. Component Construction). In
Secret Reconstruction, all m participants exchange components through pri-
vate channels, each participant recovers the secret independently by adding
up all m components. Roughly speaking, since all components are required
in recovering the secret, the scheme are capable of frustrating IP and HTCC
attacks.
More detailed description are given as follows.
1) Share Generation
Suppose there are n shareholders U = {Ui|Ui ∈ F ∗p , i ∈ In}, In =
{1, 2, ..., n} and a dealer D in the scheme, LC is a [n + 1, t] linear code
of length (n+ 1), dimension t. D chooses two large primes p,q with p > nq2
and Gt×(n+1) = (~g0, ~g1, ..., ~gn), the public generator matrix of LC, ~gi is a
column vector, i = 0, 1, ...n. Gt×(n+1) has rank t, i.e., any t column vectors
are linearly independent while any set of t + 1 column vectors are linearly
dependent, which guarantees that any t or more than t shareholders are
qualified to reconstruct the secret, but less than t shareholders are unquali-
fied. The following Vandermonde matrix is an option of Gt×(n+1) for distinct
Ui ∈ F ∗p , i = 0, 1, ..., n.
Gt×(n+1) =

1 1 . . . 1
U0 U1 . . . Un
U20 U
2
1 . . . U
2
n
...
U t−10
...
U t−11
. . .
. . .
...
U t−1n
 (4− 1)
The dealer first randomly chooses the secret s ∈ Fq and determines a
non-zero row vector ~v = (v0, ..., vt−1) ∈ F tp privately such that s = ~v~g0 mod p,
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and then generates the code word ~w = (s, s1, ..., sn) = ~vGt×(n+1). Finally,
the dealer allocates si to Ui as the share secretly for i = 0, 1, ...n.
2) Component Construction
If m, (m ≥ t) participants, Um = {Ui|i ∈ Im}, (Im ⊆ In, |Im| =m≥
t), need to recover the secret s, they determine the corresponding public
coefficients {bi|bi ∈ F ∗p , i ∈ Im} non-interactively such that ~g0 =
∑
i∈Im
bi~gi mod
p holds. {bi|bi ∈ F ∗p , i ∈ Im} is easy to find because {~gi|i ∈ Im} and ~g0 are
linearly dependent. Take Im = {1, 2, ...,m} for example, each participant
Uj ∈ Um can independently determine {bi|bi ∈ F ∗p , i ∈ Im} as follows, Uj first
let bi = 1 for i = 1, ...m − t, and then evaluates the remaining t coefficients
bm−t+1, bm−t+2, ..., bm, such that ~g0 = (
∑m−t
i=1 ~gi +
∑m
i=m−t+1 bi~gi) mod p. In
this way, all participants share {bi|bi ∈ F ∗p , i ∈ Im} without interaction.
Each participant, e.g. Ui ∈ Um, picks a random number ri∈UFq in private
and constructs a component as
ci = (bisi + riq) mod p.
Remark 4.2. As a matter of fact, bi can be directly expressed as
∏
j∈Im−{i}
U0−Uj
Ui−Uj mod
p due to Lagrange interpolation if the dealer chooses Gt×(n+1) as in (4-1).
Therefore, ci = (bisi + riq) mod p is actually the function of si, ri and Um,
it further means the component ci binds the participant (i.e. its share si)
with all participants Um and protects the share si from exposure by random
number ri.
3) Secret Reconstruction
Each participant in Um, e.g. Ui, releases the component ci to the oth-
ers through corresponding private channels. After obtaining all components
{cj |j ∈ Im}, Ui recovers the secret as
s = (
∑
j∈Im
cj mod p) mod q.
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Entities:
Dealer: D;
n shareholders: U = {Ui|Ui ∈ F ∗p , i ∈ In}, In = {1, 2, ..., n}; Ui is
the public identity of each shareholder;
m out of n shareholders: Um = {Ui|i ∈ Im}, Im ⊆ In, |Im| = m ≥
t;
Parameters:
Public primes: p, q with p > nq2;
Linear code: LC with length n+ 1 and dimension t;
Public generator matrix of LC:
Gt×(n+1) = (~g0, ~g1, ..., ~gn) with rank t, column vector ~gi ∈ F tp,
i=0, 1, ..., n;
Private row vector: ~v = (v0, ..., vt−1) ∈ F tp;
Secret:s = ~v~g0 mod p, s ∈ Fq;
Algorithms:
1) Share Generation
D randomly picks s ∈ Fq, designates ~v = (v0, ..., vt−1) ∈ F tp and
Gt×(n+1), such that s = ~v~g0 mod p, allocates si = ~v~gi mod p to Ui
as the share privately and securely for i = 1, 2, ..., n, makes Gt×(n+1)
public and keeps ~v and s in secret.
2) Component Construction
To recover the secret, m shareholders, Um form a tightly coupled
group. That is, according to some specified rule (see step 2) in
section 4.2), each participant Ui ∈ Um first determines the unique
set of public coefficients {bi|bi ∈ F ∗p , i ∈ Im} by itself such that
~g0 =
∑
i∈Im bi~gi mod p. Then it picks a random number ri∈UFq
privately to compute a component as ci = (bisi + riq) mod p.
3) Secret Reconstruction
Each participant Ui ∈ Um releases ci to the other participants
through private channels. After collecting all components, each
participant independently recovers the secret as s = (
∑
j∈Im cj mod
p) mod q.
Fig. 3: (t,m,n)-Tightly Coupled Secret Sharing Scheme
4.3. Correctness
Theorem 4.1. In (t,m,n)-TCSS, any t or more than t shareholders are
able to reconstruct the secret from all their components. That is, given
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m (m ≥ t) shareholders Um = {Uj|j ∈ Im}, each shareholder Uj with the
component cj = (bjsj + rjq) mod p, j ∈ Im, the secret can be recovered as
s = (
∑
j∈Im
cj mod p) mod q.
Proof.
(
∑
j∈Im cj mod p) mod q
= (
∑
j∈Im bjsj mod p+
∑
j∈Im rjq) mod p mod q
= (s+
∑
j∈Im rjq) mod p mod q (4− 2)
= (s+
∑
j∈Im rjq) mod q (4− 3)
= s
Note that we have s+
∑
j∈Im rjq ≤ s+m(q−1)q < nq2 < p due to s ∈ Fq,
rj∈UFq and p > nq2. As a result, (4-2) is equivalent to (4-3).
5. Security analyses of (t,m,n)-TCSS Scheme
In (t,m,n)-TCSS, we use component to protect a participant’s share. To
reconstruct the secret, adversaries must get either at least t right shares or
all m, (m ≥ t) valid components if m participants collaborate. We show the
security by the following 4 theorems. Theorem 5.1 shows that one cannot
figure out the share from a given component; Theorem 5.2 proves the capa-
bility of (t,m,n)-TCSS against IP attack while Theorem 5.3 guarantees the
scheme is resistant to HTCC attack; Theorem 5.4 testifies to the fact that
up to t−1 Insiders are still unable to reconstruct the secret in (t,m,n)-TCSS.
Theorem 5.1. In (t,m,n)-TCSS, given ci = (bisi + riq) mod p, the com-
ponent of participant Ui (i ∈ Im), the probability for an adversary to derive
the share si is 1/q, i.e.
P(si|ci) = 1/q,
where are p, q large primes with p > nq2, ri is uniformly distributed in Fq, si
and bi are over Fp and F
∗
p respectively.
Proof: From ci = (bisi + riq) mod p, we have
si = (b
−1
i ci − qb−1i ri) mod p,
where b−1i is the multiplicative inverse of bi modulo p. Note that ri, from the
view of an adversary, is indistinguishable from a random variable uniformly
distributed over Fq.
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Obviously, the value of b−1i , p and q are known, given ci, the share si is a
function of ri from the adversary’s view. According to the property of finite
field Fp, there must be different values of si for distinct ri. Consequently,
there are totally q distinct values of si when ri varies over Fq. As a result,
an adversary derives si from ci with the probability 1/q for ri∈UFq.
Theorem 5.1 implies that, given the component ci, an adversary never has
a chance more than 1/q to get the covered share si, which is as difficult as
directly guessing the secret when it is uniformly selected from the secret space
Fq. The theorem shows a share can be well protected by the component.
In the following, we give Lemma 5.1, Lemma 5.2 and Corollary 5.1
as the basis to prove that a component has a uniform distribution over Fq,
which in turn lays the groundwork for Theorem 5.2 and 5.3.
Lemma 5.1. Suppose that random variable x is uniformly distributed in
Fp, for any value t ∈ F ∗p , xt has a uniform distribution over Fp.
Proof: we immediately get the lemma from the property of finite field Fp.
Lemma 5.2. Given prime p and random variables xi, i = 1, 2, .., k, mu-
tually independent and uniformly distributed in Fp,
∑k
i=1 tixi mod p has a
uniform distribution over Fp if not all values ti ∈ Fp, i = 1, 2, ..., k , are zero.
Proof: Let us first consider the case of k = 2 then generalize the case of k
being any positive integer.
1) If one of t1 and t2 is zero, it is obvious that (t1x1 + t2x2) mod p is
uniformly distributed over Fp from Lemma 5.1.
If both t1 and t2 are nonzero, t1x1 and t2x2 are uniformly distributed
over Fp from lemma 5.1. To prove (t1x1 + t2x2) mod p is uniformly dis-
tributed in Fp, we assume that x11 and x12 are any 2 different values of
variable x1. In this case, t1x11 and t1x12 are obviously distinct in Fp for
gcd(t1, p) = 1. Thus, (t1x11 + t2x2) mod p and (t1x12 + t2x2) mod p are 2
distinct permutations of {0, 1, 2, ..., p− 1} when x2 varies over Fp. More gen-
erally, (t1x1i + t2x2) mod p are distinct permutations of {0, 1, 2, ..., p− 1} for
different x1i, (i = 0, 1, 2, ..., p − 1), values of random variable x1. That is,
each value in {0, 1, 2, ..., p− 1} appears with the same frequency. Therefore,
t1x1 + t2x2 is uniformly distributed in Fp.
2) Now that (t1x1+t2x2) mod p is uniformly distributed in Fp, by iterating
the procedure in 1), we have that
∑k
i=1 tixi mod p has a uniform distribution
over Fp.
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Corollary 5.1. (
∑k
i=1 aixi +
∑l
j=1 bjyj) mod p has a uniform distribution
over Fp if random variables xi and yi are uniformly distributed over Fp
and Fq respectively for i = 1, 2, .., k and j = 1, 2, .., l, where all variables
are mutually independent, p and q are positive primes with q ≤ p, values
ai, bj ∈ F ∗p , j, k ∈ Z.
Proof: (omitted) the corollary can be proved by the method similar to
lemma 5.2.
Theorem 5.2. The proposed (t,m,n)-TCSS scheme is able to thwart IP
attack. Concretely, an Outsider-1, even having collected (m − 1) compo-
nents, cannot forge a valid component to recover the secret.
Proof: We first consider the normal case that m, m ≥ t + 1, partici-
pants, e.g. Um = {U1, U2, ..., Um} for simplicity, form a tightly coupled group
by constructing the corresponding components {c1, c2, ..., cm}. That is, each
participant Ui ∈ Um constructs the component ci = bisi + riq = (bi~v~gi +
riq) mod p with the share si. Thus, (c1, c2, ..., cm) = ~v(b1~g1, b2~g2, ..., bm~gm) +
(r1q, r2q, ..., rmq) mod p where each bi, i = 1, 2, ...,m, actually represented
by Uj, j = 1, 2, ...,m, is public while ~v is secret and ri, i = 1, 2, ...,m, are
private.
Suppose the Outsider-1 impersonates Um in Um, i.e., it does not have sm,
the valid share of Um, but can communicate with the others and thus receive
valid components {c1, c2, ..., cm−1}.
In the following, we first show that, for an Outsider-1, cm, the component
of Um, is indistinguishable from a random variable uniformly distributed
in Fp. Then, we prove that the Outsider-1 forging a valid component is
nearly as difficult as directly guessing the secret within the secret space.
Finally, we show that the Outsider-1 cannot get the secret by forging multiple
components.
1) First, we show that, in the view of Outsider-1, each unknown share
and the corresponding component are uniformly distributed over Fp.
We have si = ~v~gi with non-zero vector ~v = (v0, ..., vt−1) ∈ F tp and ~gi =
(1, Ui, U
2
i , ...,
U t−1i )
T ∈ F tp, where each vi is an integer uniformly and privately selected by
the dealer within Fp. From the view of Outsider-1, each vi is indistinguishable
from a random variable uniformly distributed over Fp; ~gi is a nonzero column
vector for Ui ∈ F ∗p , 1 ≤ i ≤ n. According to Lemma 5.2, each unknown share,
si = ~v~gi mod p, is uniformly distributed over Fp for an Outsider.
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Obviously, the corresponding component ci = (bisi + riq) mod p, (ci ∈
Cm) and
∑m
i=1 ci mod p are also uniformly distributed over Fp according to
Corollary 5.1. Note that, for the Outsider-1, si and ri are uniformly dis-
tributed over Fp and Fq respectively while bi and q are fixed values.
2) In this case, the Outsider-1 is allowed to forge any value of cm, say
c′m. Assume F(.) is some function which takes C ′m = {c1, c2, ..., cm−1, c′m} or
any subset of C ′m as input and produces a presumed secret, e.g., s′ = F(C ′m)
as output. In practice, F(.) denotes any method taken by the Outsider-1
to derive a presumed secret s′ from available information, i.e., C ′m or its any
subset. Without losing the generality, suppose that the Outsider-1 derives
a value s′ = F(C ′m) in some way, if s′ happens to equal the secret s, the
Outsider-1 succeeds. Now let examine the probability of success, P (s′ = s).
s′ = s = (
∑m−1
i=1 cm + cm) mod p mod q
→ s′ = (∑m−1i=1 cm + c′m) mod p+ λq, λ ∈ Z
→ s′ − (∑m−1i=1 cm + c′m) mod p = λq, λ ∈ Z (5− 1)
Note that the left-hand side of (5-1) is uniformly distributed of Fp. Con-
sequently, there are at most bp/qc + 1 possible values of λ satisfying the
equation (5-1), and thus P (s′ = s), the probability for an Outsider-1 to
impersonate a legal shareholder, is not larger than (bp/qc + 1)/p. Due to
limq→+∞(bp/qc + 1)/p = 1/q, the Outsider-1 successfully forging a compo-
nent is nearly as difficult as directly guessing the secret within Fq.
3) Step 2) shows that every time the Outsider-1 forges a component c′m,
it only has the probability of nearly 1/q to obtain the secret. Moreover,
forging one component does not increase the probability of success for forging
another component since the unknown component cm is uniformly distributed
over Fp for the Outsider-1. Consequently, the Outsider-1 theoretically has
a probability more than 1/2 to obtain the secret only when it forges more
than q/2 different components. However, q is a larger integer, forging q/2
different components is infeasible.
Therefore, the proposed (t,m,n)-TCSS scheme is able to thwart IP attack
from an Outsider-1.
Theorem 5.3. Our (t,m,n)-TCSS scheme is able to prevent HTCC at-
tack. Concretely, if Cm is the component set of a tightly coupled group with
m (m ≥ t) legal participants, an Outsider-2, having cracked less than dm/2e
private channels, obtain nearly no information about the secret, i.e.
lim
q→+∞
I(s;CJ) = 0 for CJ ⊂ Cm
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Proof: For simplicity, supposem (m ≥ t) legal participants, {U1, U2, ..., Um},
form the tightly coupled group by constructing component set Cm = {c1, c2, ..., cm}
accordingly. If an Outsiders-2 cracks less than dm/2e private channels, it in-
tercepts at most m − 1 components, e.g., CJ = {c1, c2, ..., ci, ..., cj} with
ci = (bisi + riq) mod p, ri∈UFq, j < m.
To prove the theorem, we first identify the upper bound of P (s|CJ), the
probability of the secret s with CJ . Then we complete the proof limq→+∞I(s;CJ) =
0. Finally, we show that mounting multiple HTCC attacks is impractical.
In the proof of Theorem 5.2, we already showed that, for an adversary,
e.g., Outsider-2, each unknown share and the corresponding component are
uniformly distributed over Fp.
1) Now let examine the probability for the Outsider-2 to recover the secret
s from CJ , i.e., P (s|CJ).
Outsider-2 derives a presumed secret s′ = F(CJ), where F(.) is a function
similar to that in the proof of Theorem 5.2, which takes CJ or its subset as
input and produces a presumed value s′ as output. Successfully recovering
the secret from CJ means s
′ = s =
∑m
i=1 ci mod p mod q, namely,
(
∑m
i=1
ci mod p− s′) mod p = λq, λ ∈ Fp. (5− 2)
Note that the left side of (5-2) is uniformly distributed over Fp according
to Lemma 5.2. Consequently, there are at most bp/qc + 1 valid values of λ
satisfying (5-2).
As a result, P (s|CJ) is no larger than (bp/qc+ 1)/p.
2) Note that the secret s is uniformly selected from Fq in the view of
Outsider-2, i.e., the probability P (s) = 1/q. As a result, for any small value
ε, the mutual information of s with CJ is
I(s;CJ) = H(s)−H(s|CJ) ≤ log q−log pbp/qc+1 = log q(bp/qc+1)p < log p+qp =
log p/q+1
p/q
< ε.
Thus, limp/q→+∞I(s;CJ) = 0, i.e., limq→+∞I(s;CJ) = 0 due to p/q > nq.
3) Similar to the case in Theorem 5.2, the Outsider-2 may obtains dif-
ferent CJ or subsets of CJ by cracking different group of private channels,
and derives a distinct value of s′. Every time it derives a value of s′, the
probability of success is always the same for |CJ | < m − 1. Therefore, it is
impractical for the Outsider-2 to figure out the secret by mounting multiple
HTCC attacks.
Remark 5.1. Theorem 5.3 implies that an adversary, even with m − 1
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components, is still unable to obtain the secret. To figure out the secret,
an Outsider-2 has to crack at least dm/2e private channels to intercept all
m components Cm = {c1, c2, ..., cm}. Therefore, (t,m,n)-TCSS can thwart
HTCC attack and is more robust than traditional (t,n)-SSs in defeating pri-
vate channel cracking attack.
Insiders, who have valid shares, may conspire and try to reconstruct the
secret directly with their shares. The following theorem ensures that the
proposed scheme is still secure even if t− 1 Insiders conspire.
Theorem 5.4. In the proposed (t,m,n)-TCSS, less than t Insiders cannot
obtain the secret. That is, less than t Insiders obtain nearly no information
about the secret s, i.e.
lim
q→+∞
I(s; S′) = 0,
where S′ denotes a set of less than t shares available for Insiders.
Proof: For simplicity, assume that Ut−1 = {U1, U2, ..., Ut−1} are the (t − 1)
Insiders with the corresponding shares St−1 = {s1, s2, ..., st−1} , st = ~v~gt mod
p is the unknown share for Ut−1 and the secret is s =
∑t
i=1 bisi mod p mod q,
where bi ∈ Fp, i = 1, 2, ..., t, can be publicly determined from the generator
matrix.
Obviously, from the view of Ut−1,
∑t
i=1 bisi mod p is indistinguishable
from a random variable uniformly distributed over Fp. The same as in The-
orem 5.2 and 5.3, we assume F(.) is any function which takes St−1 or its
subset as input and produces a presumed secret s′ as output. Suppose that
Ut−1 derives a presumed secret s′ = F(St−1) from St−1.
Similarly, let examine the probability P (s|St−1), i.e., P (s′ = s).
s′ = s→ s′ = ∑ti=1 bisi mod p mod q →∑ti=1 bisi mod p− s′ = λq(5− 4)
From Lemma 5.2, the left side of (5-4) is uniformly distributed over Fp
for Ut−1 since the unknown st has a uniform distribution over Fp. Similarly,
for any less than t Insiders with the corresponding share set S′, the property
of uniform distribution over Fp still holds.
Consequently, similar to the case in Theorem 5.3, there are at most
bp/qc + 1 values of λ satisfying (5-4) in Fp, i.e., less than t Insiders ob-
tain the secret with the largest probability (bp/qc+ 1)/p, namely, P (s|S′) =
(bp/qc+ 1)/p. As a result,
I(s; S′) = H(s)−H(s|S′) ≤ log q − log p/(bp/qc+ 1)
and thus limq→+∞I(s; S′) = 0.
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Remark 5.2. Theorem 5.2-5.4 show that (t,m,n)-TCSS is asymptotically
perfect for both Insider and Outsider.
6. Comparisons of (t,m,n)-TCSS
The proposed scheme improves the security of traditional (t,n)-SS based
on components. As far as we know, Harn’s SSR scheme [13] is the most sim-
ilar to (t,m,n)-TCSS. So we compare our scheme with Harn’s SSR and some
other traditional (t,n)-SSs. Moreover, since Shuffling schemes and threshold
changeable SSs have potential in preventing IP and HTCC attacks simulta-
neously, we also make comparisons between them and (t,m,n)-TCSS.
6.1. Tightly coupled SS
In traditional (t,n)-SSs, a participant can reconstruct the secret as long
as it obtains t or more than t shares. Consequently, a participant, even
without a valid share, may obtain the secret after collecting t shares from
enough participants. For the same reason, in (t, n)-threshold changeable SS
schemes, if the threshold is changed to t′ > t and there are more than t′
participants in secret reconstruction, an illegal participant is still able to
obtain the secret. Similarly, in Harn’s (t, n)-SSR, if there are over (t+ k− 1)
participants recovering the secret (k is the number of polynomials), an illegal
participant, without a valid share, may obtain the secret or forge a valid
Lagrange component successfully without being detected [4]. Therefore, the
above 3 types of SSs are vulnerable to IP attack in general cases. The reason
is that all participants in these schemes are not tightly coupled; i.e., not
all participants are required to actually contribute to secret reconstruction;
in other words, even if some participant does not release a valid share or
Lagrange component, the secret is still can be recovered by some participant.
However, if m, (t ≤ m ≤ n) participants want to recover the secret in
our scheme, they actually first form a tightly coupled group by constructing
a component each. As a result, the secret can be recovered only if all m
participants in the group have valid shares and actually contribute to secret
reconstruction. Therefore, our scheme is tightly coupled.
6.2. Security
The security of our scheme does not depend on any computational as-
sumption, i.e., our scheme is independent of one way function or conventional
hard problems, such as Discrete Logarithm Problem, Factorization and so on.
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Traditional (t,n)-SSs, such as Shamir’s SS [1], Asmuth-Bloom’s SS [23],
Mig-
notte’s SS [21] and linear code based (t,n)-SSs [26] are vulnerable to both
HTCC and IP attacks. As mentioned above, Harn’s SSR [13] is actually
vulnerable to IP attack when the number of participants is large enough to
make all participants’ Lagrange Components linearly dependent [4] (see Table
1). Most (t,n)-Threshold changeable SS schemes are also vulnerable to IP
attack in the case that the number of participants is larger than the changed
threshold t′. In comparison, our (t,m,n)-TCSS is capable of preventing both
HTCC and IP attacks without such limitations.
Obviously, Threshold changeable SSs can prevent IP and HTCC attacks
only when the current threshold t′ is equal to m, the number of participants.
Therefore, we set their changed threshold in Table 2 to be m to guarantee
the capability of preventing both attacks. Table 2 shows that, in preventing
HTCC attack, related threshold changeable SSs[5][9][10][6], complete shuf-
fling scheme [15] and our scheme can force an Outsider-2 to crack at least
dm/2e private channels before obtaining the secret. But for the partial shuf-
fling scheme [14], the lower bound of cracked private channels is only t, which
is irrelevant to m, the number of participants, and thus is not so desirable
as our scheme.
6.3. Efficiency
Each shareholder in Harn’s SSR has k ≥ 2 shares, some threshold change-
able SSs [11][5][12] also require each shareholder to hold multiple shares. In
contrast, each shareholder in (t,m,n)-TCSS only holds a single share.
Both tables list the approximate number of messages and operations.
In communication, m participants in complete shuffling scheme [15] need
to send m(m − 1), (approximate to m2) extra messages before exchanging
shares in secret reconstruction. Similarly, m participants in partial shuf-
fling scheme [14] need to exchange m extra messages. In comparison, our
proposed scheme needs no additional message exchange before participants
release their components. Therefore, our scheme is as efficient as traditional
(t,n)-SSs in communication.
In computation, each participant needs to generate a component and then
recover the secret from all components. To construct a component, each
participant, e.g., Ui just needs to pick a random integer ri independently
and evaluates the component ci = (bisi + riq) mod p without interaction.
To recover the secret, a participant just needs to add all components up
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simply. In total, our scheme needs about 2m additive and 2m multiplicative
operations modulo p per participant during secret reconstruction, which is
the most efficient scheme. (see Table 1 and Table 2).
6.4. Information Rate
Information rate is the size ratio of secret to share, which denotes the
efficiency of a shareholder sharing a secret. In Shamir’s (t,n)-SS and the
linear code based (t,n)-SS, the information rate is 1 because the secret and
shares are from the same range. But the information rate of Asmuth-Bloom’s
scheme is less than 1 because each share has a bigger value domain than the
secret. The information rate of our proposed scheme is log q/ log p, which can
be confined between 1/2 and 1/3 by picking p and q with q3 > p > nq2 for q
is much larger than n. The information rate of our scheme is lower than that
of Shamir’s SS, which is just the cost our scheme pays for the above extra
security.
However, the information rate of Harn’s SSR scheme [13] is 1/k, because
each participant holds k shares and each share has the same range as the
secret. Harn’s SSR scheme has a lower information rate than our scheme
for k > 3. Although the information rate of Harn’s SSR scheme is 1/2 for
k = 2, which is higher than ours, the restricted condition kt >n−1, i.e.,
2t >n−1 requires at least one half of all n shareholders to participate in
secret reconstruction; thus, it is impractical in the case with a large number
of shareholders. For Harn’s dynamic threshold SS [5], the information rate
is 1/t since each shareholder uses a polynomial of degree t − 1 over GF (p)
as its share and the secret is a value over GF (p).
6.5. Summary
To sum up, in security, the proposed (t,m,n)-TCSS is tightly coupled
and capable of preventing IP and HTCC attacks without special limitations.
Therefore, it is more secure when compared with related schemes. In storage,
each participant in our scheme just needs to keep a single share, and thus
our scheme is efficient in storage and has a relatively high information rate.
In communication, our scheme is the same as Shamir’s (t, n)-SS, both are
the most efficient. In computation, our scheme is also the most efficient
especially in secret reconstruction.
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Table 1: Comparisons in communication, computation and security
schemes
SG(for 1 shareholder) CC+SR (for 1 participant) Anti- Anti- Info.
messages + mod p × mod p messages + mod p × mod p IP HTCC Rate
Shamir’s
(t,n) SS [1]
1 t t m 2m2 2m2 no no 1
Blakley’s
(t,n) SS
[22]
1 t t m O(m3)∗ no no t
t+1
Harn’s SS
[13] (k
polynomi-
als)
1 kt kt m 2km 2km no yes 1
k
Basic (t,n)-
LCSS [26]
1 t t m 2m 2m no no 1
Our
scheme
1 t t m 2m 2m yes yes ( 1
3
, 1
2
)
t-threshold, n-total number of shareholder, m-number of participants.
SG: Share Generation; CC: Component Construction; SR: Secret Reconstruction
∗ O(m3) is the complexity of Gaussian elimination for each participant to recover the secret.
Table 2: Comparisons in communication, computation and security
(t,n)-threshold schemes
shares (for 1 SG(for 1 shareholder) CC+SR (for 1 participant) Extra- Anti- LCC Info.
shareholder) messages + × messages + × Msgs IP Rate
Steinfeld et al [10] 1 1 t t m O((m + t)e)* 0 yes dm/2e 1
Nojoumian et al [7] 1 1 t t > 3m O(mt) O(mt) > 2m2 yes dm/2e 1
Yuan et al [6] m− t + 1 1 mt mt m 2m 2m m yes dm/2e 1
m−t+1
Harn et al [5] t 1 t2 t2 m 5m + 2t 4m + 2t 0 no dm/2e 1
t
Complete shuffling [15] 1 1 t t 2m 3m 2m m2 yes dm/2e 1
Partial shuffling [14] 1 1 t t m 3m 2m m yes t 1
Our scheme 1 1 t t m 2m 2m 0 yes dm/2e ( 1
3
, 1
2
)
SG: Share Generation; CC: Component Construction; SR: Secret Reconstruction;
t: original threshold m: the number of participants and the raised threshold value;
LCC: the Least private Channels to Crack before Outsider-2 obtaining the secret;
Extra-Msgs: the total number of additional message exchange before m participants releasing their
shares or components to recover the secret
∗ O((m + t)e): the complexity of solving the CVP in lattice, e is some fixed exponent.
Note: 1) all schemes are under the communication model that each pair of shareholders/participants
has a private channel; 2) all threshold changeable SSs raise their thresholds from t to m (m > t).
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7. Application to Group Authentication
To facilitate authentication in group oriented applications such as group
chat in Wechat, Harn proposed the notion of Group Authentication [20],
which allows each group user to check whether all users belong to the same
group at once.
Concretely, (t,m, n)-Group Authentication can be formulated as follows.
The group manager GM computes tokens, si, i = 1, 2, ..., n from a selected
secret s, allocates each token, i.e., si to group member Ui ∈ U securely
and makes H(s) publicly known, where H(.) is a one-way hash function. In
(t,m, n)-Group Authentication, there are m users, Pi, i = 1, 2, ...,m, each
user Pi computes a component ci from its token and releases ci to the others.
(t,m, n)-Group Authentication allows each user to verify whether all released
values are valid at once. That is,
GA{H(s) ?= H(F (c1, c2, ..., cm))} =
{
0→ ∃Pi /∈ U, i = 1, 2, ..., n;
1→ ∀Pi ∈ U, i = 1, 2, ..., n,
where GA is the group authentication algorithm and F is a public function.
Harn also presented an asynchronous (t,m, n)-group authentication scheme[20]
based on the aforementioned SSR [13]. Due to the disadvantages of SSR,
Harn’s (t,m,n)-group authentication is inflexible due to the restriction kt >
n − 1 and is vulnerable to IP attack. Based on the notion of (t,m,n) group
authentication, Parikshit N. Mahalle, et.al. [2] developed a group authenti-
cation scheme, called TCGA, for the Internet of Things, which uses Paillier
Threshold Cryptography as the underlying secret sharing scheme. Paillier
Threshold Cryptography is a public key variant of the (t,n)-SS. However, it
is doubtful whether or not the TCGA scheme is appropriate for Internet of
Things (IoT) because most nodes in IoT are low in computing power.
In the following, we will propose a group authentication scheme based on
the above (t,m, n)−TCSS, which allows each group user to independently
check whether all users belong to the same group at once.
7.1. Group authentication scheme based on (t,m,n)-TCSS
Obviously, (t,m, n)−TCSS is tightly couple. That is, to recover the se-
cret, each of m participants has to necessarily hold a valid share. In this
case, if each group member is allocated a share as the token in advance and
all users ( group members or non-members) collectively run the secret re-
construction in (t,m, n)−TCSS, the secret can be recovered only if all users
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have a valid token each. That is, recovering the secret successfully means all
users are legal group members. In this way, any user is able to authenticate
that whether all users are legal members at a time, instead of one by one.
Entities:
The Group Manager: GM;
Complete set of n group members:U = {Ui|Ui ∈ F ∗p , i ∈ In},In =
{1, 2, ..., n}; Ui is the public identity of each group member.
Parameters:
Public primes: p, q with p > nq2;
Linear code: LC with length n+ 1 and dimension t;
Public generator matrix of LC:
Gt×(n+1) = (~g0, ~g1, ..., ~gn) with rank t, column vector ~gi ∈ F tp,
i=0, 1, ..., n;
Private row vector: ~v = (v0, ..., vt−1) ∈ F tp;
Secret:s = ~v~g0 mod p, s ∈ Fq;
One way hash function: H(.);
Algorithms:
1) Token Generation
GM designates ~v, s and Gt×(n+1), allocates si = ~v~gi to Ui, i =
1, 2, ...n, as the token securely, makes H(s), Gt×(n+1) public while
keeps ~v and s secret.
2) Group Authentication
(1) To authenticate any m users Pm = {Pi|i ∈ Im ⊆ In, |Im| =
m ≥ t} at once, each user Pi ∈ Pm determines the public coefficients
{bi|bi ∈ F ∗p , i ∈ Im} independently such that ~g0 =
∑
i∈Im bi~gi mod
p, and then picks random number ri∈UFq privately to compute a
component as ci = (bisi + riq) mod p.
(2) Each user Pi ∈ Pm releases the component ci to the other
users through private channels. After collecting all components,
each user computes s′ as s′ = (
∑
j∈Im cj mod p) mod q. If H(s
′) =
H(s), all users in Pm have been authenticated successfully, i.e., all
users in Pm belong to U ; otherwise there is at least one non-member
of U .
Fig. 4: Group Authentication based on (t,m,n)-TCSS
In figure 4, we present a new (t,m,n)-Group Authentication scheme base
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on the proposed (t,m,n)-TCSS. It consists of 2 algorithms, 1)Token Gen-
eration and 2) Group Authentication.
Remark 7.1. Based on (t,m,n)-TCSS, the group authentication scheme
can be easily converted into an authenticated group key agreement scheme
by modifying step (2) in 2) as follows.
(2’) Each user Pi ∈ Pm releases the component to the other users through
private channels. On collecting all components, each user computes s′ =
(
∑
j∈Im cj mod p) mod q. If H(s
′) = H(s), all users in Pm belong to U and
the group key is k =
∑
j∈Im cj mod p. Otherwise, there exists at least one
non-member of U and the group key agreement is aborted.
7.2. Correctness and security
In the proposed group authentication, a user can recover the secret and
thus authenticate all users at once if each user is a group member and releases
a valid component. Otherwise, if a user (i.e. non-member) does not have a
valid token, it cannot construct a valid component. Consequently, the secret
cannot be recovered correctly and the non-member fails to pass the group
authentication.
Theorem 7.1. In the proposed Group Authentication scheme, a non-
member, even with m− 1 valid components of a group, fails to forge a new
valid component of the group to pass the authentication.
Proof: If a non-member, with m − 1 valid components, could forge a valid
component, it must be capable of recovering the secret. However, it follows
from theorem 5.2 and 5.3 that a non-member is unable to obtain the secret
with m − 1 valid components. Therefore, the non-member fails to forge a
valid component.
Theorem 7.2. In the proposed Group Authentication scheme, t− 1 group
members fails to forge a valid token for a non-member to pass the authenti-
cation in the same group.
Proof: The theorem can be immediately obtained from theorem 5.4.
7.3. Properties and Comparisons
(1) Efficiency
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Obviously, the communication overhead is limited because each user merely
needs to release a component to the others. This can be efficiently accom-
plished by broadcasting the component if all users share a private broadcast-
ing channel.
In authentication, each user only needs to compute a component from
the token locally and releases it to the other users, and then adds its own
component and m − 1 received ones up to authenticate all users. As we
know, in secret reconstruction with m participants of traditional (t,n)-SSs,
each participant usually receives m − 1 shares from the other participants
and needs O(m2) additive/multiplicative operations to recover the secret
independently. In comparison, although our group authentication scheme is
based on (t,m, n)-TCSS, which further comes from traditional (t, n)-SS, it
requires only about O(m) additive/multiplicative operations for each user.
Besides, the proposed group authentication scheme does not depend on any
public key system and thus is more efficient in computation if compared with
TCGA [2].
Moreover, distinct from conventional authentication schemes which au-
thenticate a single user each time, our group authentication scheme authen-
ticates all users at once.
(2) Flexibility
As a matter of fact, group authentication scheme can be constructed
simply based on traditional (t, n)-SS if all users (i.e., participants in (t, n)-
SS) release their tokens (i.e., shares) at the same time. In this case, a non-
member will be detected since it release a wrong token. In contrast, the
proposed group authentication works for m (t ≤m≤ n) users and does not
require all users to release components simultaneously.
Moreover, the authentication scheme allows each user to hold only one
token and does not have limitation, such as kt > n − 1 in Harn’s group
authentication scheme or t′ = m in threshold changeable SS based group
authentication schemes.
Therefore, the proposed group authentication scheme is more flexible
compared with related schemes.
Remark 7.2. Of course, the proposed group authentication scheme can
only verify whether all users are group members, but cannot identify a non-
member if it exists. However, the scheme can be used to pre-authenticate
all users efficiently and conventional authentication schemes can be applied
if there is a non-member.
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8. Discussions
8.1. Generic method for (t,m,n)-TCSS
Section 3 actually presents a generic method of constructing (t,m,n)-
TCSS based on traditional (t,n)-SSs [1][22][23][21][24][26], which endows a
(t, n)-SS with new security features. The paper constructs the (t,m,n)-TCSS
from a linear code based (t,n)-SS [26]. Similarly, we can also design (t,m,n)-
TCSSs from Shamir’s (t,n)-SS [1] or Blakey’s (t,n)-SS [22] in the same way,
because they are all the same in nature. Even for CRT based (t,n)-SSs
[23][21], distinct from the above 3 traditional (t,n)-SSs in type, we can still
construct the corresponding (t,m,n)-TCSSs by adjusting the secret space and
adding a proper random noise in component construction.
8.2. Dynamic threshold secret sharing
In essence, (t,m, n)-TCSS dynamically changes the threshold from t to m
when m participants recover the secret. That is, our (t,m, n)-TCSS presents
a simple way to change threshold into m during secret reconstruction. More-
over, the constructed scheme is asymtotically perfect, unconditionally secure
and dealer-free after share generation. Compared with related threshold
changeable SSs, the scheme is more efficient in storage, computation and
communication.
9. Conclusion
Nowadays, group oriented applications are getting more and more pop-
ular and require more secure and efficient (t,n)-SS to satisfy their security
requirements. The paper first identifies IP and HTCC attacks against (t,n)-
SS and then presents the notion and generic framework of (t,m,n)-TCSS to
cope with them. Most traditional (t,n)-SSs can be conveniently converted
into (t,m,n)-TCSSs by following the framework and thus be endowed with the
new capability of thwarting IP and HTCC attacks. Moreover, the framework
can also be used to construct threshold changeable SSs easily from traditional
(t, n)-SS. As a matter of fact, (t,m,n)-TCSS scheme by the framework can
be applied to any scenario of traditional (t,n)-SS.
As an implementation of the framework, a concrete (t,m,n)-TCSS scheme
is constructed from the linear code based (t,n)-SS. The (t,m,n)-TCSS scheme
is capable of preventing IP, HTCC as well as (t − 1) Insiders conspiring
attacks. Moreover, the (t,m,n)-TCSS is independent of hard problems or
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one way function. Compared with Harn’s SSR scheme, it is also more secure,
more efficient in computation and higher in information rate for k > 2. In
contrast with threshold changeable SSs and Shuffling schemes, it is more
efficient in storage, communication and computation.
To complete rapid m-to-m authentication in group oriented applications,
a group authentication scheme is proposed from (t,m,n)-TCSS. It allows each
user in a group to check whether all users are legal group members at once.
Compared with related schemes, the proposed authentication scheme is more
flexible and efficient.
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